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INTRODUCTION
The power to appoint and remove executive officials has been a
point of controversy between legislative and executive branches since the
period before the English Civil War saw the rise of Parliament to take on
the role of a lawmaking authority capable of challenging the crown. In
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American constitutional jurisprudence, questions about the appointment and
removal powers are among the earliest constitutional issues confronted by
Congress, and those issues continue to be hotly debated to the present day.
What has changed in the intervening two centuries, of course, is the
emergence of the administrative state; debates over appointment and
removal often take the form of trying to make doctrines and principles from
an earlier era fit into this new historical context. In particular, a line of
recent cases in the U.S. Supreme Court culminating in Seila Law LLC v.
CFBP in 2019 has developed a new orthodoxy that is supposed to guide
future consideration of appointment and removal controversies. This article
argues that in his majority opinion in Seila Law Roberts, in particular,
makes three fundamental errors:
1.

he fails to recognize the relationship between
separation of powers and checks and balances as
competing and at times contradictory guiding
principles;

2.

he fails to take account of the constitutional
implications of the modern administrative state;
and

3.

he uncritically adopts an 18th century
understanding of political accountability and
applies that understanding in a formalistic and
ultimately self-defeating way to the conditions of
modern politics.

These errors did not arise from nothing, they are rooted in the doctrinal
developments of the past decades. Nonetheless, this article argues, Roberts’
Seila opinion, the test it establishes, and the justifications for that test taken
together represent an additional step in a wrongheaded direction.
This article is in four parts. First, I will review some of the
historical background concerning appointment and removal powers.
Second, I will present the line of recent cases that define the modern
doctrine on removal powers leading up to the most recent rulings. Third, I
will review Seila Law and its redefinition of the standards for permissible
design of independent agencies with respect to removal powers. Finally, I
will present the points of critique identified above.
I. THE HISTORY OF REMOVAL POWER CONTROVERSIES
In the months leading up to the English Civil War, there was an
exchange of written statements (a “Remonstrance” and an “Answer”)
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between Parliament and Charles I.1 Parliament had already issued its
Petition of Right of 1628, demanding no taxation without consent of
Parliament, no imprisonment without cause, no quartering of soldiers, and
no imposition of martial law in peacetime.2 In 1642, on the eve of civil war,
Parliament sent a “Grand Remonstrance” to the King. Comprising
“Nineteen Propositions,” the Remonstrance was essentially a demand for
ceding control of all actions of government to Parliament.3 The first three of
the propositions referred to control over the appointment and removal of
government officials, including members of the King’s own Privy Council.
The first proposition called for the dismissal of all members of the King’s
Privy Council “excepting such as shall be approved of by both Houses of
Parliament,” the second provided that Parliament should have veto power
over the selection of future councilors; and the third required parliamentary
approval for the appointment of various high officers. The judiciary, too,
was to be given a dramatic role in governing the operations of the Crown
government. The eleventh Proposition specific the oath of office for council
members and made violations of that oath punishable by judicial
proceedings, while the twelfth proposition demanded that the King give up
the power of removal with respect to judges. In his “Answer” Charles
identified the last limitation on his removal power as a particular
infringement. The twelfth proposition, he declared, would be “the first
round of that Ladder, by which Our Just, Ancient, Regall Power is
endeavoured to be fetched down to the ground.”4
Parliament’s demands went beyond control over the appointment
and removal of the members of the Privy Council. In addition, the role of
the council was altere.5 All measures proposed by the Crown would have to
be approved by a majority vote of the Council, making the body a veto
point of the King’s authority rather than advisory while Parliament would
have sole jurisdictions over questions of lawmaking. “Which Demands,”
1. 1642: Propositions Made by Parliament and Charles I’s Answer, ONLINE
LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1642-propositions-made-byparliament-and-charles-i-s-answer [https://perma.cc/TGX4-GLPM] (last visited
Jan. 4, 2021); The English Civil War, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY,
https://oll.libertyfund.org/groups/68 [https://perma.cc/BC23-PLEU] (last visited
Jan. 4, 2021).
2. 1628: Petition of Right, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, https://oll.liberty
fund.org/page/1628-petition-of-right [https://perma.cc/Z8JK-6FWK] (last visited
Jan. 4, 2021).
3. 1642: Propositions Made by Parliament and Charles I’s Answer, ONLINE
LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1642-propositions-made-byparliament-and-charles-i-s-answer [https://perma.cc/TGX4-GLPM] (last visited
Jan. 4, 2021).
4. Id.; see generally Colin Tyler, Drafting the Nineteen Propositions,
January-July 1642, 31 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 263–312 (2012).
5. ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, supra note 3.
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responded Charles, “are of that Nature, that to grant them were in effect at
once to depose both Ourself and Our Posteritie.”6
In the dispute between Parliament and Charles, both sides
recognized that appointment and removal powers are directly connected to
execution of the laws and especially control over prosecutions. In addition,
Parliament’s demands would have converted the King’s control over
government to a set of constraints on that control exercised by Parliament
through the organs of the Executive, senior officials, and the Privy
Council.7 For an analogy, one may imagine that the members of a
President’s cabinet were to be appointed with the consent of both houses of
Congress and, furthermore, that any executive action would require a
majority vote by the Cabinet. Both relations between the Executive and the
Legislative branches and, equally important, relations among constituent
elements of the Executive are at issue.
Appointment and removal were not key issues in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, but the Bill of Rights of 1689 strengthened
Parliament’s authority over the execution as well as the creation of laws,
providing that laws could not be suspended nor could taxes be collected
without consent of Parliament.8 The Act creating the Bill of Rights listed
offenses by James I, including “prosecutions in the Court of King's Bench
for matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament.” As had been the case
with respect to Charles I, Parliament objected to the exercise of excessive
executive control over the prosecutorial function.9
Turning to the American context, during the debates leading up to
the Constitution, various positions were articulated. Article II provides that
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,” but because it would
be “impossib[le]” for “one man” to “perform all the great business of the
State,” the Constitution assumes that lesser executive officers will “assist
the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.”10 The
question is who controls the process of appointing and removing these
executive officers? The text of Article II section 2 provides only a partial
answer:

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. English Bill of Rights 1689, YALE L. SCH. AVALON PROJECT,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp [https://perma.cc/WY32-RM
5C] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (2020); GEORGE WASHINGTON, To Eleonor Francois Elie,
Comte de Moustier, May 25, in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, vol. 30, at 333, 334 (John C.
Fitzpatrick, ed., 1939).
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[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other officers of the United States, whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads of departments.”11
In addition, “Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior
officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads of departments.”12 There are noticeable lacunae in the clause; it
does not define “inferior officers,” and it describes the process of
appointment but not removal.
The issue came to a head in1789, when James Madison introduced
legislation creating the positions of Secretary of War, Secretary of the
Treasury, and Foreign Secretary. Madison’s description of the Foreign
Secretary’s position specified presidential removal power, saying “that
there shall be established an executive department, to be denominated the
department of foreign affairs; at the head of which there shall be an officer,
to be called, the secretary to the department of foreign affairs, who shall be
appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate; and to be removable by the president . . . .”13 In Madison’s view, the
power to remove officials was an essential mechanism to protect the
Executive branch from being taken over by Congress. Madison argued that
requiring a President to accept subordinate executive officials who lacked
“loyalty” would “thwart the Executive in the exercise . . . of his great
responsibility.”14 In addition, Madison argued that giving the President
control over all executive officers would enhance accountability, as the
President could be held accountable by the voters for the actions of his
government.15 “If the president should possess alone the power of removal
from office, those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in
their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the lowest
officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
12. Id.
13. LINDA GRANT ET AL., DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vol. 3: MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3,
1791, at 726 (1972).
14. Howard Schweber, Seila Law v. Consumer Finance Protection Bureau on
Separation of Powers, in SCOTUS 2020: MAJOR DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (Morgan Marietta ed., 2021).
15. JAMES MADISON, Speech in Congress on Presidential Removal Power,
June 16, 1789, in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 453, 461 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999).
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the president, and the president on the community. The chain of
dependence therefore terminates in the supreme body, namely, in the
people.”16 Separately, Madison argued that powers of appointment—and
hence of removal—were intrinsically executive functions, so that in the
absence of specific constitutional provisions to the contrary such powers
should be assumed to belong to the President. “If the Constitution had not
qualified the power of the president in appointing to office, by associating
the senate with him in that business, would it not be clear that he would
have the right by virtue of his executive power to make such an
appointment?”17
Others disagreed with Madison’s view. Elbridge Gerry warned that
giving the President the power to remove officers would undercut the role
of the Senate. “[I]f we give the President the power to remove . . . you
virtually give him a considerable power over the appointment, independent
of the Senate.”18 Elbridge Gerry warned of the danger of arbitrary
dismissals. “Suppose an officer discharges his duty as the law directs, yet
the president will remove him; he will be guided by some other criterion;
perhaps the officer is not good natured enough . . . because he is so
unfortunate as not to be so good a dancer, as he is a worthy officer, he must
be removed.”19 Gerry’s reference to officials’ dancing ability was facetious,
but his concern was clear: that a President with the power of arbitrary
removal would have too much personal control over the conduct of the
Executive branch. James Jackson of Georgia argued that keeping
congressional control over the appointment and removal of the Secretary of
the Treasury, in particular, was critical to preventing the President from
usurping Congress’ power of the purse. “If he has the power of removing
and controlling the treasury department, he has the purse strings in his
hand.”20 The question of authority to remove financial officials—the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller General, and others—remains
one of the most hotly contested questions of removal power to this day.21

16. GRANT ET AL., supra note 13, at 925.
17. Id. at 868.
18. HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOLUME I STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 171
(2nd ed. 2017).
19. GRANT ET AL., supra note 13, at 1022–23.
20. Id. at 1002.
21. See Aditya Bamzai, Tenure of Office and the Treasury: The Constitution
and Control Over National Financial Policy, 1787 to 1867, 87 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1299, 1303, 1385–86 (2019) (reviewing debates over status of Treasury
officials and concluding that, between 1789 and the trial of Andrew Johnson,
financial institutions were treated as no different from other government offices
with respect to presidential control but “private corporations” such as the First and
Second National Bank were conceived as separate from the Executive due to
performing “non-sovereign” functions).
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A third position held that dismissal required the consent of the
Senate in order to parallel the process of appointment. Theodorick Bland
reasoned that since the Constitution gave the power of appointment to the
President and the Senate, “it naturally follows, that the power which
appoints shall remove also.”22 Bland made a motion on May 19 to add, “by
and with the advice and consent of the senate” which was defeated.23
Yet a fourth view held that since the Constitution was silent on the
question of removal, Congress had the authority to create offices with
whatever rules of dismissal it found appropriate. Roger Sherman reasoned
that “[a]s the officer is the mere creature of the legislature, we may form it
under such regulations as we please . . . we may say he shall hold his office
during good behavior, or that he shall be annually elected; we may say he
shall be displaced for neglect of duty, and point out how he should be
convicted of it—without calling upon the president or senate.”24 For
Sherman, the silence of the text implied Congress had authority to delegate
to the President the power of removal or to refrain from doing so in all
cases.25 Finally, “[s]ome argued that since the constitutional text did not
provide a mechanism for removal, executive positions implicitly carried life
tenure subject to impeachment.”26
“The ‘Decision of 1789,’” as it is known, was inconclusive (making
the name inapt); proposed Executive departments were approved, but the
general question was left unresolved.27 In response to Black’s concerns the
statute creating the Department of the Treasury contained detailed
descriptions of the duties of various officials, while the statutes establishing
the Departments of State and War referred to duties assigned by the
President.28 The variation among those statutes was only one indication that
no general rule governing future offices had been agreed to.29
22. GRANT ET AL., supra note 13, at 737.
23. Id. at 738.
24. Id. at 917.
25. Id.
26. Howard Schweber, Seila Law v. Consumer Finance Protection Bureau on
Separation of Powers, in SCOTUS 2020: MAJOR DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 141, 143 (Morgan Marietta ed., 2021).
27. J. DAVID ALVIS ET AL., THE CONTESTED REMOVAL POWER, 1789–2010, at
11 (2013); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1021, 1072 (2006).
28. Compare An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65,
67 (1789) (describing in detail specific duties of the Secretary, the Comptroller,
Treasurer, Register and Auditor, and providing that “whenever the Secretary shall
be removed from office by the President . . . the Assistant shall, during the
vacancy, have the charge and custody of the records”), with An Act for
Establishing an Executive Department, to be Denominated the Department of
Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28 (1789) (“that there shall be a principal officer
therein, to be called the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs, who shall
perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or
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The problem that faced the First Congress was a conceptual one
that frequently creates confusion in modern discussions.30 There is a
common tendency even among Supreme Court Justices to talk about
separation of powers and checks and balances as though they are equivalent
concepts. In fact, they are very nearly opposite. ‘Separation of powers’ is
the idea that each branch should be supreme within its ambit, without being
subject to interference from the other two.31 ‘Checks and balances’ are
created when powers overlap: Congress has the power to make laws but the
President has the power of veto but Congress has the power of override;
Congress has power over expenditures but the Executive has discretion over
the process of spending the money; Congress can create criminal and
administrative laws but the Executive has discretion over their
enforcement.32 And in all of this the courts act as referees, preserving the
effective system of checks and balances against the danger of excessive
concentration of control over policymaking in one of the other branches.33
The relationship between separation of powers principles and
checks and balances remained unresolved in 1789. In 1803, however, John
Marshall’s Supreme Court added some clarity to the general understanding.
In Marbury v. Madison, Marshall declared that where an appointment
constituted a vested property right, officers of the Executive branch had no
discretion; their act of carrying out the appointment would be purely
“ministerial.”34 Prior to that point—or outside that process—questions of
appointment were political, left to the discretion of the Executive branch
and no proper business of the courts. Marshall just carved out an area of
discretionary removal power and its limits; where Congress created an
office outside the scope of the President’s removal power, the Executive
branch became an instrument of congressional authority.35 More generally,
intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the
Constitution,” with no reference to removal), and An Act to Establish an Executive
Department, to be Denominated the Department of War, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49 (1789)
(“that there shall be a principal officer therein, to be called the Secretary for the
Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time
to time be enjoined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the United States,
agreeably to the Constitution,” again with no reference to removal.) In structure
and content the latter two Acts are identical, while the Act establishing the
Department of the Treasury is the outlier.
29. See generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1035–37 (2006).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 143–44.
33. Id. at 144.
34. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 158 (1803).
35. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Appointment and Removal of
William J. Marbury and When an Office Vests, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199
(2013).
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the implication was that the Executive branch was bound by procedural
requirements in cases of removal; it was the completion of those procedures
that caused the officeholder’s position to “vest.” In a parallel case, Stuart v.
Laird, Marshall upheld the Removal Act of 1802 by which Jefferson and
his supporters in Congress tried to remove Federalist judges by abolishing
the courts to which they had been appointed.36 As a result, another principle
was announced: Congress has the power to remove officials by abolishing
their offices, a power that can presumably be exercised with or without the
support of the sitting President if Congress has the votes to override a
veto.37 Both Marbury and Stuart concerned judicial appointments; would
these principles apply equally in the case of Executive officials?
That question arose during the Jackson administration. At odds
with Congress over the propriety of a national Bank, Jackson ordered his
Secretary of the Treasury to remove all federal deposits. In a moment with
foreshadowings of Watergate’s “Saturday Night Massacre,”38 the Secretary
of the Treasury, William J. Duane, refused to carry out the order, so
Jackson fired him and replaced him with Attorney General Roger Taney
who was rewarded for his loyalty with an appointment as Justice of the
Supreme Court in 1835.39 Whigs in Congress argued that Jackson had no
authority to give the order to remove deposits in the first place. They
pointed out that the Bank charter gave authority over federal deposits to the
Secretary of the Treasury, not the President.40 In response, Jackson
articulated the theory of the “unitary executive,” which held that since the
President controlled the appointment and removal of executive officers, all
their actions were his actions and subject to his control.41 Thus, if Congress
delegated authority to the Treasury Secretary, the President could instruct
the Treasury Secretary on how to exercise that authority and could replace
him at will if he failed to obey. Jackson’s chief opponent in Congress,
36. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803).
37. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA.
L. REV. 1779, 1805 (2006).
38. The term “Saturday Night Massacre” refers to events of Saturday, October
23, 1973. On that day, at the height of the Watergate investigation, President Nixon
ordered his Attorney General Elliott Richardson to fire special prosecutor
Archibald Cox. When Richardson refused to carry out the order Nixon fired him,
and turned to the second-ranking official in the Justice Department, William
Ruckelshaus. Ruckelshaus also refused to carry out the order and was likewise
fired, at which point Nixon turned to the third-ranking official in the Justice
Department, Robert Bork. Bork carried out Nixon’s orders and fired Cox, an action
that was the source of some of the Democratic resistance to his nomination to the
Supreme Court in 1987.
39. Schweber, supra note 26, at 144.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK GRABER, & KEITH WHITTINGTON,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOLUME I STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 230
(2013)).

2021]

A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION

469

Henry Clay, argued that, under the 1789 statute creating the Department of
the Treasury the Secretary was “constituted the agent of Congress.”42 As a
result, whatever the President’s powers of control and removal in other
contexts, the Treasury—with its control over the power of the purse—
should be treated as independent. “The treasury department is placed by law
on a different footing from all the other departments . . . Except the
appointment of the officers, with the co-operation of the Senate, and the
power which is exercised of removing them, the president has neither by
the Constitution nor the law creating the department, anything to do with
it.”43 In fact, the statute creating the Secretary of the Treasury position
explicitly referenced the possibility of presidential removal, but it also
spelled out the duties of the Secretary and other officers in great detail, i.e.,
it articulated a congressional specification of powers and duties.44
During the Jacksonian era, Presidents used their powers of
appointment and removal to institute the infamous spoils system, rewarding
both party and personal loyalty and punishing political enemies.45 To the
extent the courts considered the validity of these practices they generally
supported presidential authority. In 1839, the Court ruled that the clerk of a
district court could be fired at the discretion of the judge; in dicta, Justice
Thompson used that minor controversy to review his understanding of the
principles of removal authority. “[I]t was very early adopted, as the
practical construction of the Constitution, that this power [of the President
to remove officers appointed with the concurrence of the Senate] was
vested in the President alone.”46 Thompson also pointed to congressional
legislation including provisions in the statutes establishing the first three
Departments in 1789.47 And finally, Thompson explained that the general
principle that the official with the power of appointment had the power of
removal, as in the case of a Secretary appointing junior officials or a judge
appointing a court clerk. These clerks fell under that class of inferior
officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to
vest in the head of the department. According to Thompson, “[t]he same
rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the
appointment is vested in the President alone . . . all inferior officers
appointed under each by authority of law must hold their office at the
42. HENRY CLAY, On the Removal of Deposits, in THE WORKS OF HENRY
CLAY COMPRISING HIS LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 575, 584 (Calvin
Colton ed., 1904).
43. GRANT ET AL., supra note 13, at 319, 321.
44. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (1789).
45. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During
the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1451 (1997); LEONARD D.
WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1829-1861, at
109 (1954).
46. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259 (1839).
47. Id.
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discretion of the appointing power.” Such is the settled usage and practical
construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are
held. 48
Control over finances was also involved in an unusual provision of
the 1863 Banking Act that created a new Comptroller of the Currency to
deal with the national currency that had been created by the Legal Tender
Act the previous year.49 The Comptroller was removable five years unless
sooner removed by the President, which could only occur by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.50 This unique specification of a
consultative role in removal was removed the next year in the Banking Act
of 1864, replaced by a provision providing for the removal of the
Comptroller by the President “upon reasons to be communicated by him to
the Senate.”51
Despite the fact that it was operative for only one year, the 1863
Banking Act version of the removal provision was cited as precedent for the
Tenure in Office Act of 1867 that prohibited President Johnson from
removing any of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and the
Interior, as well as the Postmaster-General and the Attorney General
without “the advice and consent of the Senate.”52 That Act was a creation of
radical Republicans in Congress as a mechanism to constrain President
Andrew Johnson.53 The enmity between Congress and the President at this
point in time was the closest the United States has ever come to the
relationship between Parliament and Charles I leading up to the English
Civil War, and the Tenure of Office Act has clear echoes of the Nineteen
Propositions contained in the Grand Remonstrance of 1631 that was
discussed at the beginning of this article. When Johnson defied the law and
removed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, Congress responded with articles
of impeachment; the major issue in the Senate trial was the constitutionality
of the Tenure in Office Act.54 Johnson avoided removal in the Senate by a
single vote. The first Republican Senator to vote against impeachment was
William Fessenden of Maine, a leading figure among radical Republicans
who had been Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury and had opposed the
48. Id. at 260.
49. National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
50. Id.
51. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 100 (1864).
52. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867). For a review of the
arguments in favor of the Tenure of Office Act, see Bamzai, supra note 21, at
1381–82. Edwin Stanton declared that the 1863 law “restored to the letter and true
spirit of the Constitution, with the concurrence of all parties.” 3 ANDREW JOHNSON
ET AL., TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 86 (1868).
53. Bamzai, supra note 21, at 1380.
54. Id.
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1863 terms of removal for the Comptroller.55 Fessenden insisted that
presidential control over removal was established by the precedent of long
practice, dismissing the 1863 provision (which he had opposed) as an
aberration. Presidential authority over removal, he declared, “has been
uniformly recognized in practice; so long and so uniformly as to give it the
force of constitutional authority.”56
The political environment of removal controversies changed as the
federal government dramatically expanded beginning in the late 1870s.57
One of the driving forces behind the growth of executive agencies was the
Progressives’ belief in the efficacy of regulatory executive agencies.58 The
Progressive ideal involved disinterested experts providing sound policy
mandates based on non-political considerations.59 The same “good
government” ideals were behind the adoption of the Pendleton Act that
created the modern civil service.60 These two developments fundamentally
changed the landscape of debates over removal authority.
The Pendleton Act took an enormous number of federal employees
outside of the category of “removal” entirely by creating legal rights to
hiring based on merit and job security thereafter.61 The employees covered
by these protections were not “officers” of any kind, and therefore, their
appointment and removal did not fall within the Appointments Clause.62
“When [the Pendleton Act] was enacted under President Arthur, the act
initially protected 11 percent of the government’s 131,000 employees, but it
allowed the president to extend the merit system to additional employees by
adding them to the classified civil service. After Cleveland was defeated for
re-election in 1888, he expanded the merit system” to cover 27,000 federal
employees, a move that had “a slow but incremental effect in making the
federal civil service less political and more professional.”63 The law also
had ethics provisions that prevented officials from soliciting campaign
contributions on federal property. That rule was found to be violated in
55. Id. at 1382–83.
56. Id. at 1382 (quoting 3 ANDREW JOHNSON, TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 18 (1868)).
57. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 39 (1981);
Michael Nelson, A Short, Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy, 44 J.
OF POLS. 747, 768 (1982).
58. THOMAS M. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 127 (1984).
59. SKOWRONEK, supra note 57, at 64.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 71–72.
62. Compare United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878), with United
States v. Hartwell 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867) (Treasury Clerk an “officer” because
appointed by the head of a “Department” (acting Treasury Secretary)).
63. STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 213 (2008).
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1906 when “E.S. Thayer, a member of the Texas Republican state
committee, wrote to a federal tax official . . . ‘You are now . . . receiving a
salary of $900 per year. I, therefore, ask you to at once . . . remit the sum of
$45, it being 5 percent of your salary. This is very important.’”64 The
Pendleton Act was created to protect civil servants from this kind of
shakedown as well as to bring an end to the spoils system.
Another transformative event was the creation of the independent
regulatory commissions. These entities did not fit the traditional tripartite
model of separation of powers at all, as they exercised rulemaking,
adjudicatory, and enforcement authority all at once.65 Their responsibilities
were likewise different from traditional models as they were charged with
promoting as well as overseeing the industries they regulated.66 According
to the designs approved by Congress, the heads of these agencies would be
“inferior officers”; hence, Congress was free to vest the appointing
authority in the President, the courts, or “the heads of departments.” The
constitutional limitations on removal remained unclear; the Tenure in
Office Act remained in force while the regulatory agencies continued to
expand in number and importance.
The first independent regulatory commission was the Interstate
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) in 1887.67 Only the year before, in United
States v. Perkins,68 the Supreme Court, while upholding congressional
control over the terms of removal for a naval cadet engineer, had stated a
limiting principle that the exercise of that authority would be proper only if
there was no resulting interference with the President’s performance of his
duties. The members of the ICC were subject to removal by the President
only for cause (“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance”); did the
inclusion of such a provision interfere with the President’s performance of
the duties of his office? In the 1903 case Shurtleff v. United States, an
identical “for cause” provision was tested in the case of a customs
appraisers removed by President McKinley without notice or any stated

64. Ruth Marcus, Many Interpretations of Obscure Law, WASH. POST:
CAMPAIGN FIN. (Oct. 2, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
special/campfin/stories/cf100297a.htm [https://perma.cc/S97C-ZVRB].
65. Center for Effective Government, A Brief History of Administrative
Government (Feb. 7, 2021, 3:40 P.M.), https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461
#:~:text=The%20period%20between%201865%20and,bring%20order%
20into%20industry%20competition.&text=In%20some%20cases%20industries%2
0themselves,to%20help%20end%20competitive%20practices. [https://perma.cc/97
9R-HYVF].
66. Id.
67. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce
Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of America’s
Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1151–52 (2012).
68. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1886).
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reason.69 Justice Peckham reasoned that the “for cause” provision was not
exclusive; the President retained inherent power of removal unless
Congress had excluded that authority with “very clear and explicit
language.” The “for cause” provision, said Peckham, did not satisfy that test
because it did not explicitly exclude removal for other reasons.70 Peckham
further observed that dismissal for cause would have triggered procedural
protections; reasoning backward he concluded that the dismissal must have
been for no cause at all under the President’s inherent removal power and
was therefore not reviewable by a court.71
The rulings in Perkins and Shurtleff represented significant judicial
pushback against Congress’ assertion of control over the removal of
executive officials, but they did not represent an outright rejection of
congressional authority on constitutional grounds. That step was taken in
1926 in Myers v. United States.72 For a 6–3 majority, Taft issued a ruling
that threatened to undermine the entire system of independent regulatory
agencies.73 First, the ruling overruled the Tenure in Office Act, thus
restoring presidential removal authority with respect to the (non-inferior)
executive officers specified in the law. The specific issue in the case,
however, involved an inferior officer and, by extension, the scope of
congressional authority over removal of inferior officers generally
including agency heads. A statute enacted by Congress provided that
“postmasters of the first, second, and third class may be removed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their
offices for four years unless sooner removed according to law.”74 Taft ruled
that the law was unconstitutional by virtue of its inclusion of an advice and
consent requirement.75 Extending the principle that “the power of removal
is incident to the power of appointment,” Taft ruled that, if Congress gave
the President the power of appointment of inferior officers, an unrestricted
presidential power of removal was necessarily implied.76 There were three
dissenting opinions.77 Justice McReynolds argued that an absolute power of
removal as an incident of Executive authority should require explicit
language, which was missing from the Constitution.78 Justice Holmes
adopted the position that Congress had the authority to create positions and

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 312 (1903).
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 318.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id. at 106.
Act of July12, 1876, 19 Stat. 78, 80 (1876).
Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 177, 178, 240.
Id. at 178–239.
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therefore had the power to assign powers of removal as well as appointment
as they saw fit.79
In the third dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis took a different
tack. McReynolds’ and Holmes’ arguments echoed positions that had been
asserted during and since the “Decision of 1789.” Justice Brandeis offered a
different gloss, one that had also appeared in previous debates.80 Brandeis
appealed to a half century of consistent practice of Senate concurrence in
removal of executive officials as precedent establishing constitutionally
acceptable practice.81 Taft asserted that there was no such precedent in the
formal provisions of statutes with the exception of the 1863 National Bank
Act, which Taft declared had been “adopted without discussion of the
inconsistency.”82 Brandeis, by contrast, described the statute as, "[t]he first
substantial victory of the civil service reform movement.”83 For Brandeis,
the focus on reform was key. He quoted Justice Story in 1833 for the
proposition that congressional power over removal was an essential guard
against corruption: “it will be a consolation to those who love the Union
and honor a devotion to the patriotic discharge of duty that, in regard to
‘inferior officers’ (which appellation probably includes ninety-nine out of a
hundred of the lucrative offices in the government), the remedy for any
permanent abuse is still within the power of Congress by the simple
expedient of requiring the consent of the Senate to removals in such
cases.”84
Taft’s majority opinion drew immediate and vigorous criticism by
virtue of its obvious threat to the system of independent agencies that had
been created over the preceding four decades. Erwin Corwin described the
ruling as a “menacing challenge to an administrative organization which
represents years of planning and experimentation in meeting modem
conditions.”85 Sure enough, in 1935 in Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States,86 the Court issued a new ruling, carving out a set of principles that
shielded independent agencies from the operation of the constitutional
principle it had announced in Myers. Humphries Executor concerned a “for
cause” provision limiting the President’s authority to remove members of
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).87 The Federal Trade Act of 1914
provided that members of the Commission could be removed by a President
only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
79. Id. at 177, 240.
80. Id. at 240–94.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 165.
83. Id. at 282.
84. Id. at 240.
85. Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power under the
Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 399 (1927).
86. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628–30 (1935).
87. Id. at 618–19.
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sutherland introduced a
new, function-based distinction between purely executive agencies and
those that were “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial.”88 Sutherland found
that the FTC was not a purely executive agency because it carried out
policymaking and the adjudication of claims—saying, “its duties are neither
political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasilegislative”89— and therefore its members could be shielded from removal
without cause. The rule of Myers remained in place, but it was declared to
be inapplicable to an official “who occupies no place in the executive
department and who exercises no part of the executive power vested by the
Constitution in the President.”90 Finally, Sutherland severed the analytical
equation of appointment and removal powers. There was no inherent
presidential power of removal for “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative”
functions regardless of the manner of appointment.91 Sutherland’s opinion
contained a perfect expression of the Progressive ideal: “The commission is
to be nonpartisan, and it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with
entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except
the policy of the law. . . . [I]ts members are called upon to exercise the
trained judgment of a body of experts appointed by law and informed by
experience.”92
II. MODERN DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS
Later cases applied the principles of Humphrey’s Executor to
various specific situations, but the tension between the principles expressed
in Myers and Humphrey’s Executor provided the background for the
analysis. In Bowsher v. Synar,93 the Court reviewed a provision of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 198794 stating that the U.S. Comptroller
General could only be removed for cause, a situation remarkably similar to
those in 1863 and 1864. One important difference was that under the Act
the existence of budget deficits as determined by the Comptroller would
trigger automatic budget cuts.95 The Directors of the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) and the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) were
required to report to the Comptroller General regarding their
recommendations for how much must be cut. The Comptroller General was
then supposed to evaluate these reports, make his own conclusion, and give
88. Id. at 622.
89. Id. at 624.
90. Id. at 628.
91. Id. at 629.
92. Id. at 624.
93. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717 (1986).
94. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, H.R. 7130,
93rd Cong. (1974).
95. Id.
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a recommendation to the President, who was then required to issue an order
effecting the reductions recommended by the Comptroller General unless
Congress made the cuts in other ways within a specified amount of time.96
Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for a 7–2 majority, held that the
limitation on the removal powers of the President was unconstitutional
because in the context of the law the actions of the Comptroller General
were “the very essence of the ‘execution’ of the law.”97 Burger reasoned
that the Comptroller General was effectively “commanding” the President
to carry out budget cuts, and thus specifying the manner in which a law was
to be executed.98 Burger’s analysis thus applied the Humphrey’s Executor
analysis but found that the Comptroller was a different kind of officer from
the head of the FTC.
In Morrison v. Olson,99 the Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of a special prosecutor law. According to the arguments of
the appellants, prosecution of crimes is unquestionably a classic executive
function, and therefore, the power to remove a special prosecutor should
rest entirely with the President.100 This was an argument that did not rely on
the equation of powers of appointment with powers of removal, as the
process for the appointment of a special prosecutor involved a referral from
the House of Representatives to the Attorney General and then a
determination by a “Special Division” (a non-Article III court). Authority
over the removal of the Special Prosecutor, in turn, rested with the Attorney
General. The law was a post-Watergate measure designed to insure the
possibility of a genuine investigation of criminal wrongdoing by members
of the Executive Branch.101
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion upholding the
law.102 In Rehnquist’s view, the Special Prosecutor was an “inferior officer”
whose terms of office were subject to congressional control. Rehnquist
emphasized the fact that the Special Prosecutor had limited duties and that
removal authority rested with the Executive branch if not with the President
himself, an argument that rejected the implications of the Jacksonian theory
of the unitary executive. Rehnquist therefore found that there was no
usurpation of Executive functions by Congress.103 The analysis focused on
two specific questions: first, whether the “for cause” restriction on the
Attorney General’s removal authority “impermissibly interferes with the
President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed functions,” and
second, whether the law “taken as a whole” reduced the President’s
96. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732.
97. Id. at 733.
98. Id.
99. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
100. Id. at 655–56.
101. Id. at 673.
102. Id. at 655–58.
103. Id. at 657.
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authority to control criminal prosecutions.104 Rehnquist found that the
restriction on removal authority was only partial. “[B]ecause the
independent counsel may be terminated for ‘good cause,’ the Executive,
through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the
counsel is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a
manner that comports with the provisions of the Act.”105
On the second second question in the case, Rehnquist noted that the
law did not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers by
assuming control over executive functions, nor did the Special Division’s
role constitute a judicial intrusion on Executive authority.106 Rehnquist
rejected a formalistic approach defining categories of officials in favor of a
functionalist analysis. “The analysis contained in this Court's removal cases
is designed not to define rigid categories . . . but to ensure that Congress
does not interfere with the President's exercise of the ‘executive power’ and
his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully
executed’ under Article II.” Rehnquist found that the imposition of a good
cause requirement for dismissal did not have the effect of “unduly”
interfering with the performance of executive functions. Importantly,
Rehnquist gave deference to Congress’ determination that the limitation on
the removal power was “essential” to ensuring the independence of the
independent counsel.107
Justice Scalia wrote a famous dissenting opinion. Scalia went back
to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 for an articulation of a pure
tripartite separation of powers principle.108 “In the government of this
Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them . . . to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men.”109 Scalia argued that, as a matter of
practical politics, an Attorney General would feel compelled to seek the
appointment of a Special Prosecutor on an application by Congress, and
that in any case the law put the burden on the Attorney General to find an
absence of good cause to decline to recommend the appointment.110 “Thus .
. . Congress has effectively compelled a criminal investigation of a highlevel appointee of the President.”111 In Scalia’s view, the question was
binary and formal: if the function in question was executive in nature, then
all control over its exercise must remain with the Executive. He argued that
Rehnquist’s analysis of what constituted too much intrusion on executive
prerogatives missed the point; any such intrusion rendered an agency’s
104. Id. at 685.
105. Id. at 692.
106. Id. at 656–57.
107. Id. at 657–58 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting. MASS. CONST. art. XXX).
110. Id. at 701–02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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design constitutionally suspect. “It effects a revolution in our constitutional
jurisprudence for the Court, once it has determined that (1) purely executive
functions are at issue here, and (2) those functions have been given to a
person whose actions are not fully within the supervision and control of the
President, nonetheless to proceed further to sit in judgment of whether ‘the
President's need to control the exercise of [the independent counsel's]
discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch’ as to
require complete control.”112 Scalia thus articulated the theory of the unitary
executive and swept the question of removal powers in the context of law
enforcement into the broader ambit of that theory. “[T]he President's
constitutionally assigned duties include complete control over investigation
and prosecution of violations of the law.”113
Scalia’s Morrison dissent was the beginning of a movement to
challenge the constitutional basis of the entire system of independent
agencies under the theory of the unitary executive.114 In Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Court heard a
challenge to a system in which members of the Board could only be
removed for cause, and the determination of “cause” was left to an
overseeing Commission.115 Roberts found that this arrangement created a
double layer of insulation from presidential control by both imposing a
good cause requirement and depriving the President of authority to
determine when good cause for termination existed. “The result is a Board
that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not
responsible for the Board.”116 Roberts’ argument opened (or re-opened) the
question of the unitary executive by couching the conclusion in terms of the
extent of presidential control over executive functions. At the same time, by
distinguishing between a double and a single layer of removal restrictions,
the Court avoided confronting the conflict between Rehnquist and Scalia’s
positions in Morrison, to the evident disappointment of then District Court
Judge Brett Kavanaugh who had called Free Enterprise Fund “the most
important separation of powers case regarding the President’s appointment
and removal powers in the last 20 years.”117

112. Id. at 708-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Steven D. Schwinn, Does the For-Cause Removal Provision for the
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Impermissibly Encroach on
the President's Constitutional Power to Direct and Control the Executive Branch If So, is It Severable from the Rest of the Dodd-Frank Act (19-7), 47 U.S. PREVIEW
OF SUP. CT. CAS. 22, 24 (2020).
115. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
484 (2010).
116. Id. at 495.
117. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667,
685 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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Then came the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau. In 2011, in
the aftermath of the catastrophic Great Recession of 2008, Congress
established the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).118 Like
many administrative agencies, the CFPB was designed to be independent,
with a head who, rather than serving at the pleasure of the President, served
a five-year term and could only be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.” In the first decade of its operation, the
CFPB brought numerous actions against financial institutions, recovering
more than $11 billion in damages for the US Treasury.119
The first constitutional challenge came in 2018 in PHH Corp v.
120
CFPB. The en banc opinion of the District Court of Washington, D.C.
ran 250 pages with six separate opinions. The majority opinion was written
by Judge Cornelia Pillard.
Pillard began by reviewing basic principles. “The Court has
repeatedly held that ‘a “good cause” removal standard’ does not
impermissibly burden the President's Article II powers, where ‘a degree of
independence from the Executive . . . is necessary to the proper functioning
of the agency or official.’ Armed with the power to terminate such an
‘independent’ official for cause, the President retains ‘ample authority to
assure’ that the official ‘is competently performing his or her statutory
responsibilities.’”121
The reason for this general statement of principles was to set up the
radicalism of PHH’s position. “[PHH] would have us cabin the Court's
acceptance of removal restrictions by casting Humphrey's Executor as a
narrow exception to a general prohibition on any removal restriction—an
exception it views as permitting the multi-member FTC but not the soleheaded CFPB. The distinction is constitutionally required, PHH contends,
because ‘multi-member commissions contain their own internal checks to
avoid arbitrary decisionmaking.’”122
While the formal analysis is long, multi-part, and complex,
ultimately there were two reasons Pillard was reluctant to accept PHH’s
argument.123 First, the implications threatened the entire system of
independent agencies. PHH’s claim that courts could easily distinguish
single-headed from multi-member agencies, said Pillard, was somewhere
between unconvincing and outright disingenuous. “PHH seeks no mere
course correction . . . PHH makes no secret of its wholesale attack on

118. 12 U.S.C.S. § 5491 (LexisNexis 2010).
119. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2188
(2020).
120. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(en banc).
121. Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 79–80.
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independent agencies—whether collectively or individually led—that, if
accepted, would broadly transform modern government.”124
Critically, Pillard rejected PHH’s assertion that there was a clearly
identifiable constitutional difference between single-headed and multiheaded agencies. “[T]he constitutional distinction PHH proposes between
the CFPB's leadership structure and that of multi-member independent
agencies is untenable. That distinction finds no footing in precedent,
historical practice, constitutional principle, or the logic of presidential
removal power.”125 In other words, granting the challenge to CFPB’s
structure would open the door to challenges to all independent agencies
since there was no identifiable constitutional distinction.
Second, Pillard rejected the argument that the differences in
patterns of decision-making between individual and group decision-makers
as a matter of internal institutional checks had constitutional significance.
This was an argument based on what was essentially a game theoretic
model with political variables.126 “The relevance of ‘internal checks’ as a
substitute for at-will removal by the President is no part of the removalpower doctrine.” In his concurring opinion, Judge Tatel put the point more
starkly: “The Constitution no more ‘enacts’ social science about the
benefits of group decisionmaking than it does ‘Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics.’”127
Other arguments that PHH raised—and that Pillard rejected—were
more familiar. In response to the claim that the design of the CFPB was
new, Pillard pointed to other examples that he said were essentially similar,
and further argued that the novelty of a practice was not determinative of its
constitutionality.128 Novelty “is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for
everything. . . . The independent counsel, the Sentencing Commission, and
the FTC were each ‘novel’ when initiated, but all are constitutional. In the
precedents PHH invokes, novelty alone was insufficient to establish a
constitutional defect.”129 Perhaps most importantly, Pillard invoked a norm
of judicial deference in saying that Congress had exercised its valid
authority in deciding that the design of the agency was necessary to achieve
its purposes, similar to Rehnquist’s argument concerning the design of the
office of the Special Prosecutor in Morrison.130
Finally, PHH mounts a slippery-slope argument against the CFPB.
Sustaining the CFPB's structure as constitutionally permissible, PHH
124. Id. at 80.
125. Id. at 79–80.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 113 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
128. Id. at 102–03.
129. Id. (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549
(2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 92–93.
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argues, could threaten the President's control over the Cabinet, an argument
that appeared to reach back to before the adoption of the Constitution and
its Appointments Clause.131 None of these arguments was found to be
persuasive by the majority.
On the other hand, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, dissenting, picked up
on the argument raised by PHH—directly inspired by Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in Morrison—declaring that securing executive control
over removal power was essential to “liberty.” “The purpose of the
separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary
Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but
to preserve individual freedom.”132
In the understandings of Progressives, independent agencies were
to be enterprises that would work cooperatively with the Executive and
Legislative branches as well as with private sector stakeholders. In
Kavanaugh’s description, those agencies were an alien force operating
outside the constitutionally designed branches of government. “The
independent agencies collectively constitute, in effect, a headless fourth
branch of the U.S. Government . . . Because of their massive power and the
absence of Presidential supervision and direction, independent agencies
pose a significant threat to individual liberty and to the constitutional
system of separation of powers and checks and balances.”133 Kavanaugh
adduced (or imagined) a carefully calibrated congressional strategy to keep
the “massive power” of independent agencies in check. “To mitigate the
risk to individual liberty, the independent agencies [although not checked
by the President] have historically been headed by multiple commissioners
or board members.” In Kavanaugh’s understanding, these multiple agency
head act as checks on one another, thus helping to “protect individual
liberty.”134 The principle at work, in Kavanaugh’s view, was the same
principle of accountability that explained the theory of the unitary
executive. “The overarching constitutional concern with independent
agencies is that the agencies exercise executive power but are unchecked by
the President, the official who is accountable to the people and who is
responsible under Article II for the exercise of executive power. In lieu of
Presidential control, the multi-member structure of independent agencies
operates as a critical substitute check on the excesses of any individual
independent agency head.”135
Remarkably, Kavanaugh translated this description of
congressional reasoning into a constitutional requirement without
131. Id. at 106.
132. Id. at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935)).
135. Id. at 166 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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explanation. The posited intellectual heritage seems to go something like
this: (1) in the 19th century there was a theory of the unitary executive
promoted by Jacksonians; (2) in the 20th century this theory was rejected
with the creation of the administrative state; and (3) we should now test the
constitutionality of arrangements in the administrative state by deciding
how far they are consistent with a theory of accountability that was the
justification for the 19th century unitary executive theory. What is missing
are any effort to ask how political accountability works in practice in the
case of independent agencies; how multi-member control is more likely to
prevent excesses than to lead to partisan capture or paralysis; whether
Congress considered those questions in coming up with its single-headed
model; whether courts owe deference to Congress on questions of what
practices do or do not contribute to political accountability; or whether
Congress’ balancing of goals of accountability and efficacy should guide
judicial review.
III. SEILA LAW LLC V. CONSUMER FINANCE PROTECTION BUREAU136
The constitutional challenge to the structure of the CFPB reached
the Supreme Court in 2020 in Seila Law.137 Roberts’ majority opinion and
Kagan’s dissenting opinion largely reiterated arguments presented in PHH
by Judge Pillard and Judge Kavanaugh, respectively, but with additional
elements.138 Seila Law thus stands as the (disturbing) expression of the
current Supreme Court doctrine on questions of removal powers.
A. Roberts’ Majority Opinion: A Theory of Political Accountability
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Seila Law referenced
nearly all the arguments that have been mentioned so far and even a few
more. First, Roberts eagerly embraced a version of the unitary executive
theory, which he insisted was essential for accountability: “Under our
Constitution, the executive Power—all of it—is vested in a President . . .
Without such power, the President could not be held fully accountable for
discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere
else.”139
Second, Roberts read the historical record as an unbroken
affirmation of the unitary executive theory. Where another reader might
have perceived a shifting landscape of competing principles, adjustments to
new conditions, movement in one direction or another over time, and an
undertheorized set of underlying justifications captured in terms like
“quasi-legislative” or “impermissible interference,” Roberts saw no such
136. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2191 (internal quotations omitted).
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ambiguities. In his reading, the historical record is a consistent affirmation
of unilateral presidential authority over removal of all executive branch
officials subject to two highly specified exceptions. “Our precedents have
recognized only two exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal
power. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, we held that Congress
could create expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable
by the President only for good cause. . . . And in United States v. Perkins,
and Morrison v. Olson, we held that Congress could provide tenure
protections to certain inferior officers with narrowly defined duties.”140
Roberts’ reading of Humphrey’s Executor to make the multi-member
character of the Federal Trade Commission the key to its immunity from
removal at will is remarkable; the majority’s discussion of “quasilegislative” functions is treated as at best a secondary concern. To make his
account work Roberts is engaging in a violent imposition of a narrative
completely invisible to its participants.
In this way, Roberts embraces the central distinction between
individual and non-individual agency leadership that Judge Pillard had
found to be without constitutional significance.141 In fact, in Roberts’ telling
the difference between individual and group leadership is a core
constitutional principle that has previously been unrecognized.142 The
President, Roberts notes, occupies a unique position by virtue of his being
an individual rather than a congress or a court. “To justify and check that
authority—unique in our constitutional structure—the Framers made the
President the most democratic and politically accountable official in
Government. Only the President (along with the Vice President) is elected
by the entire Nation.” 143 Roberts uncritically adopts Madison’s “chain” of
accountability model. “Through the President’s oversight, the chain of
dependence [is] preserved, so that the lowest officers, the middle grade, and
the highest all depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on
the community.”144
Madison had been discussing the accountability of Executive
officers, heads of “Departments” who would in turn be in charge of their
junior officials. But of course, Madison’s council had been made subject to
the Exceptions Clause providing congressional authority to define the terms
of employment and removal of inferior officers, subject to a massive
exception in the form of the Pendleton Act, and most importantly,
ambiguous in the case of independent agency. Roberts simply ignores these
elements in his discussion. Further, Roberts embraces Kavanaugh’s
140. Id. at 2192 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 2197; PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 96
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
142. Seila, 140 S.Ct. at 2202.
143. Id. at 2203 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 479 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ominous description of executive agencies as a “headless fourth branch of
the U.S. Government.”145 Yet he did not, however, extend the Madisonian
principle to either of two obviously possible conclusions: that Congress
should lack the authority to create inferior officers other than by
Presidential appointment, or that where Congress specified Presidential
appointment there would be an implied inclusion of a power of removal.
Instead, Roberts reached the conclusion that where Congress put conditions
on removal—that is, “good cause” provisions or a requirement of
congressional approval—then there was an implied requirement that the
agency in question be headed by a committee rather than an individual, a
distinction that plays no role in any of Madison’s recorded comments nor
those of anyone else during the “Decision of 1789,” the Exceptions Clause,
the creation of the Civil Service, or any of the prior judicial examinations of
removal power in the context of independent agencies.146 The key
constitutional principle governing the case is drawn from a combination of
an 18th century metaphorical description of political representation and the
historical fact of a familiar practice.
Roberts justified his intellectual maneuver by appealing to an
implied theory of “liberty” that Scalia had introduced in his Morrison
dissent and that Kavanaugh enthusiastically embraced in PHH.147 In
Roberts’ telling, the great danger was “arbitrary” action by an individual
agency head uncontrolled by the threat of presidential removal. “The
Director may unilaterally, without meaningful supervision, issue final
regulations, oversee adjudications, set enforcement priorities, initiate
prosecutions, and determine what penalties to impose on private parties.”148
The same unilateral authority that rendered the President accountable for
his actions renders a single agency head unaccountable because he or she is
not elected by the national people. In other words, the justification for the
Seila Law rule depends on an empirical assertion about the nature of
politics, that Presidents are more accountable in practice than single agency
heads. That empirical assumption about the workings of the political system
is the basis for invoking a principle of “liberty,” which in turns justifies the
creation of a constitutional principle out of Madison’s remarks and prior
congressional decisions.
Roberts’ reliance on past congressional practice into a
constitutional limitation deserves examination. He appealed to historical
practice both in its positive sense (the existence of past practice suggests
constitutionality) and in its negative sense (the lack of past practice
suggests unconstitutionality.)149 “Perhaps the most telling indication of [a]
145. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
146. See Seila, 140 S.Ct. at 2183.
147. Id. at 2203; Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2623 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
148. Seila, 140 S.Ct. at 2203–04 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 2201.
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severe constitutional problem with an executive entity ‘is [a] lack of
historical precedent’ to support it.” A single headed agency like the CFPB,
he said, was “almost wholly unprecedented.”150 As for the “handful” of
exceptions, all of these cases except that of the Comptroller of the Currency
in 1863 were “modern and contested,”151 a finding that apparently deprived
them of significance as examples of prior practice. The implication, then, is
that past practice defines constitutional limits if contrary practices are
recent or “contested.”
One obvious difficulty with Roberts’ analysis is that it has nothing
to do with the discussions in Myers and Humphries Executor, or even
Morrison. To resolve this problem, Roberts attached a requirement of
multiple agency heads to the background principles of Progressive Era
reform.152 “The Court identified several organizational features that helped
explain its characterization of the FTC as non-executive. Composed of five
members—no more than three from the same political party—the Board
was designed to be non-partisan and to act with entire impartiality. The
FTC’s duties were neither political nor executive, but instead called for the
trained judgment of a body of experts ‘informed by experience.’”153 Thus,
Roberts found that the general rule of presidential removal authority of
Myers had been made subject only to a very specific exception “for
multimember bodies with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’
functions.”154
Thus, Roberts’ ultimate argument was that the President retains
authority over all removals with two exceptions: where an agency is
engaged in non-executive activities and has a multi-head structure, or in the
case of inferior officers. In Roberts’ view, however, the authority of the
CFPB Director took him outside the scope of either category. The CFPB
Director would have authority to promulgate rules under nineteen different
statutes. The decisions of the agency would be final, rather than advisory
statements delivered to an Article III court. And the agency was authorized
to seek monetary penalties, “a quintessentially executive power not
considered in Humphrey’s Executor.”155 That the agency was also
authorized to engage in non-executive activities was relegated to
irrelevance.
Ultimately, Roberts’ concerns came back to his empirical
assessment of political representation in practice. Here the argument takes a
truly remarkable turn: in the name of separation of powers Roberts wants to
ensure that the President will have direct control over policymaking. The
150. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 483 (2010)).
151. Id. at 2202.
152. Id. at 2200–02.
153. Id. at 2198 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r., citations omitted).
154. Id. at 2199 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
155. Id.
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danger, then, is that if regulatory agencies are too independent Presidents
may not be able to control their policy agendas.156 “Because the CFPB is
headed by a single Director with a five-year term, some Presidents may not
have any opportunity to shape its leadership and thereby influence its
activities.”157 Reversing his earlier course, Roberts now leaned on the fact
that the CFPB engages in non-executive actions or rulemaking as well as
enforcement, making it an important actor in policymaking. As a result,
unlike the [FTC] commission members in Humphrey’s Executor, the
Constitution required that a CFPB Director be subject to removal by a
President “based on disagreements about agency policy.”158 So the fact that
the CFPB engages in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial activities is a
reason not to shield its head from removal, and rather than avoiding an
agency intereference in the Executive’s performance of its enforcement
duties the goal is to ensure the President’s ability to interfere with
Congress’ authority over policymaking. From a strict separation of powers
viewpoint, of course, this is an argument that turns the logics of
Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison on their respective heads. Of course,
the analysis might look different if one adopted a perspective informed by a
constitutional norm of checks and balances rather than the kind of strict and
formalistic separation of powers thinking demonstrated in the Jacksonian
theory of the unitary executive.
B. Justice Kagan’s Dissent: Checks and Balances, Politics, and Judicial
Deference
Justice Kagan wrote an opinion that can best be described as an
evisceration of Roberts’ arguments.159 The majority’s account, she wrote,
“is wrong in every respect. The majority’s general rule does not exist. Its
exceptions, likewise, are made up for the occasion—gerrymandered so the
CFPB falls outside them. And the distinction doing most of the majority’s
work—between multimember bodies and single directors— does not
respond to the constitutional values at stake.”160
The emphasis on constitutional values was a reference to Roberts’
complete abandonment of checks and balances. Kagan accused Roberts of
employing a simplistic “Schoolhouse Rock” version of separation of
powers.161 “James Madison stated the creation of distinct branches “did not
156. Id. at 2204.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2206.
159. Justice Thomas wrote an opinion calling for Humphrey’s Executor to be
overruled and for all independent and inter-branch agencies to be abolished in
order to restore a pure system of separation of powers. Id. at 2216 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
160. Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 2226 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
control over the acts of each other.”162 To the contrary, Madison explained,
the drafters of the Constitution—like those of then-existing state
constitutions—opted against keeping the branches of government
“absolutely separate and distinct.” 163 And Kagan quoted Justice Story to
back up Madison’s analysis. “[W]hen we speak of a separation of the three
great departments of government, it is not meant to affirm, that they must
be kept wholly and entirely separate. Instead, the branches have—as they
must for the whole arrangement to work—common link[s] of connexion
[and] dependence.” 164
Kagan rejected Roberts’ idea that independent agencies represent
an exception to a larger rule.165 Kagan cited a long history of Congress
creating agencies whose heads were immune from removal by the President
without cause under the authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause of
Article I, section 8. “The text of the Constitution, the history of the country,
the precedents of this Court, and the need for sound and adaptable . . .
bestow discretion on the legislature to structure administrative institutions
as the times demand, so long as the President retains the ability to carry out
his constitutional duties.”166 Thus Kagan attempted to assert the continuing
validity of the principle announced by Rehnquist in Morrison against
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in that case. Kagan was making it clear that for
all Roberts’ protestations that the majority was declining to take a step
beyond existing precedent, in fact he was undermining the doctrinal scheme
that had been in place for twenty years in favor of elevating Scalia’s thenminority position to the level of orthodoxy.
As for Roberts’ emphasis on the existence of a single agency head
rather than a commission, Kagan referred to this as a form of intellectual
“gerrymandering” designed to find a way to take the case out of the reach
of the mainstream principle. “The majority picks out that until-nowirrelevant fact to distinguish the CFPB, and constructs around it an untilnow-unheard- of exception.”167 Moreover, as Kagan pointed out, the logic
of the majority’s argument—that a single-headed agency would be too
independent of the President—contradicted the realities of administrative
operations. Kagan proposed that a single agency head was more subject to
presidential control than an equally non-removable panel of
162. Id. at 2227 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting T HE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at
325 (James Madison)).
163. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 327
(James Madison)).
164. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting 2 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTS. ON
THE CONST. OF THE U.S. OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1833)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
165. Id. at 2241 (Kagan, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 2226–27 (Kagan, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 2241 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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commissioners.168 Furthermore, Kagan argued, a President retains
numerous ways of influencing an agency short of the threat of removal, a
point that illustrated the reasons courts should stay out of the business of
limiting Congress’ decisions about agency design.169 “Compared to
Congress and the President, the Judiciary possesses an inferior
understanding of the realities of administration and the way political power
operates.”170
IV. SEILA LAW, A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
It has to be said that one searches the historical records in vain for
any kind of unified support for the principles of solitary accountability in
the President that Roberts relies on. In the debates of 1787, the idea of a
single President had competed with proposals for an Executive Council.
Edmund Randolph declared that “he should not do justice to the Country
which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishment of a Unity in
the Executive department,” instead proposing a three-member Executive
council drawn from different portions of the country.171 George Mason
made a similar proposal, and in part presented an argument specifically
about powers of appointment. “[H]he was averse to vest so dangerous a
power in the President alone.”172 Mason proposed a Privy Council, of six
members, to the President, a position in which he was joined by James
Wilson and Benjamin Franklin.173 Elbridge Gerry referred to the idea of
presidential accountability as “chimerical” on the grounds that “the
President cannot know all characters, and can therefore always plead
ignorance.”174 To be sure, others took a contrary position. Pierce Butler (S.
Car.): “If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the
whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be
taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local
advantages.”175 And of course, Roberts relied on Madison’s description of a
“chain” of accountability in the debates of 1789 over the structure of the
first Executive Departments. And of course, the argument depends on a
commitment to a mode of interpretation that privileges the understanding of
individual members of the constitutional convention. In other words, there
168. Id. at 2243 (Kagan, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
170. Id. at 2226 (Kagan, J., concurring).
171. Max Farrand, ed., THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
vol. 1, 88 (Yale Univ. Press 1911).
172. Id., vol. 2, at 527.
173. Id. at 538–39, 542.
174. Id. at 539.
175. HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, supra
note 18, at 85–86.
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were various and numerous arguments and proposal; the idea that there was
an original consensus around the position favoring a unitary executive is
unsupportable. As noted earlier, confronted by other historical statements
actors, Roberts simply found ways to discounted them in favor of a
narrative that posited a single person—Madison—who commanded
absolute agreement on his particular theory of representation and its
implications for removal powers.
The ahistoricism of Roberts’ theory is not its most problematic
element. The more important critiques of the analysis in Seila Law relate to
the body of doctrine and theories that define modern separation of powers
doctrine in the removal context. As was stated in the Introduction, there are
three points of critique that are the focus of this section:
1.

Roberts fails to recognize the relationship between
separation of powers and checks and balances as
competing and at times contradictory guiding
principles;

2.

Roberts fails to take account of the constitutional
implications of the modern administrative state;

3.

Roberts uncritically adopts an 18th century
understanding of political accountability and
applies that understanding in a formalistic and
ultimately self-defeating way to the conditions of
modern politics.

A. Roberts Fails to Recognize the Relationship Between Separation of
Powers and Checks and Balances
Early in the discussion, while talking about “the Decision of 1789,”
the point was raised that there is a critical analytical tension between
principles of separation of powers and principles of checks and balances.
The key point is that these are fundamentally opposing ideas. Checks and
balances are about overlapping, not separate, areas of authority. Where a
President has total authority over the appointment, management, and
removal of an official, there is separation of powers; where that authority is
shared with Congress, there are checks and balances. Put another way, the
desire to make the President directly accountable to the voters may mean
making him unaccountable to the other branches.
This confusion of categories becomes especially apparent when one
considers the extent to which Roberts avoids the implications of a pure
separation of powers system. If the idea were truly to cabin policymaking
power in the Congress and policy-executing power in the Executive, then
the goal should be to reduce the Executive role in the rulemaking and

490

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 460

adjudicatory processes. Even supporters of the idea of a unitary executive
may conclude that there is a simultaneous need to cabin the scope of
executive power at the same time that it is made more absolute within its
realm. From a pure separation of powers perspective, congressional control
over removal is one of the ways to prevent the Executive branch from
assuming an undue policymaking role.176
Justice Thomas was entirely willing to accept the consequences of a
pure system of separation of powers. In his view, in fact, Roberts’ logic had
already led to that conclusion: “with today’s decision, the Court has
repudiated almost every aspect of Humphrey’s Executor”177 (implying a
restoration of the absolute presidential authority rule of Myers). In Thomas’
view, the result was a rejection of the model of independent agencies tout
court in order to prevent not only congressional interference in executive
functions but also and equally executive participation in lawmaking. “The
Constitution does not permit the creation of officers exercising ‘quasilegislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial powers’ in ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasijudicial agencies.’ No such powers or agencies exist. Congress lacks the
authority to delegate its legislative power . . . Free-floating agencies simply
do not comport with [the] constitutional structure.”178
In fact, however, the Constitution itself stands against any such a
pure system with its identification of congressional authority over “inferior”
officers. Even the most absolutist equation of removal power with
appointment power (a la Peckham in Myers) cannot avoid Congress’
authority to “vest” appointment of inferior officers in “courts of law” or
“heads of departments,”179 a point Thomas does not address. And the civil
service system is based on the idea that most federal employees are not
“officers” at all. There are some modern critics who call for the abolition of
the civil service system precisely on the grounds that the Pendleton Act was
unconstitutional infringement on presidential authority;180 that would be the
logical extension of Thomas’ call for the abolition of independent agencies.
These are extreme positions born of fetishization of separation of powers
and the unitary executive at the expense of all other constitutional values.

176. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY: AN
ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EVER-EXPANDING POWERS (Harv. Univ.
Press, 2020) (recommending increasing the advice and consent role of the Senate
regarding appointments and removals).
177. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211
(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2216 (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
180. See, e.g., Phillip K. Howard, Civil Service Reform: Reassert the
President’s Constitutional Authority, THE AMERICAN INTEREST (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/01/28/civil-service-reform-reassertthe-presidents-constitutional-authority/ [https://perma.cc/Q8R6-5BYQ].
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At a theoretical level, what is missing from Roberts’ and Thomas’
(and Kavanaugh’s) arguments are a recognition of a constitutional value of
checks and balances applied to the President. Elections are the point at
which the voters hold Presidents accountable (or don’t—see discussion
below) but the idea of checks and balances is to have divisions among
overlapping areas of authority during the period in which government is
operating. The absence of serious consideration of the need for checks and
balances becomes a one-way ratchet that pushes Executive control to everhigher levels with fewer and fewer limitations. A constitutional theory of
separation of powers that undercuts the principle of checks and balances is
not “textualism,” “originalism,” or an interpretation of “constitutional
structure”; it is an abandonment of the judicial role. As institutional roles
and practices change, an unchanging and formalistic understanding of the
basic rules of operation invite unintended and destructive consequences.181
B. Roberts’ Failure to Take Account of the Constitutional Implications
of the Modern Administrative State
The existence of the modern administrative state is not mere an
historical accident, nor is it a purely political (in the partisan bargaining
sense) arrangement. Rather it is a creation of Congress and the Executive
working together to apply constitutional principles to a new set of
circumstances that developed over a period of time through
experimentation. Roberts’ description, like Kavanaugh’s, belies this
historical development and the constitutional politics involved. As a result,
the constitutional principles at work in the design and operation of the
administrative state go unrecognized.
One way this failure appears is in the presentation of a falsely
dichotomous choice between congressional or presidential control over the
appointment and removal powers. The Exceptions Clause, however,
provides for a third alternative; appointment of inferior officers by the
judiciary. It is difficult to see how a Madisonian “chain of accountability” is
preserved by putting federal judges in charge of the appointments process,
yet a constitutional interpretation that denies any role for Congress in
checking presidential removal authority opens up that alternative channel.
Even from a simple textualist perspective, then, the claim that preventing
Congress from controlling agencies preserves liberty by ensuring
presidential control depends on ignoring relevant constitutional provisions.
More generally, once again Roberts avoids the implications of a
constitutional value of checks and balances as one of the basic purposes
behind separation of powers. Checks and balances work most effectively
181. See Timothy Duncheon & Richard L Revesz, Seila Law as an Ex Post,
Static Conception of Separation of Powers, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 27,
2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/27/seila-duncheon-revesz/
[https://perma.cc/BMC7-HQ4R].
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when the lawmaking branch and the law-executing branch are required to
work cooperatively. Judicial rulings that prevent cooperative arrangements
invite either conflict or evasion. A good example is the (in)famous decision
in Chadha v. INS that struck down the practice of legislative vetoes on
separation of powers grounds.182 The result in that instance was evasion. As
Louis Fisher describes it, confronted with what Justice White (in his
dissent) had described as an “Hobbesian all-or-nothing choice . . . Congress
and executive agencies have discovered other more acceptable options:
using the legislative veto precisely as before and converting legislative
vetoes into informal understandings that give committees effective control
over agency decisions.”183
Consider the possibility of a President determined to avoid
congressional oversight. “In this area, as in others, President Trump has
pushed the envelope of accepted past practice in ways that bring the issues
into sharp relief, relying on ‘acting’ appointments to avoid advice and
consent requirements, asserting a particularly strict version of the unitary
executive, and at least appearing to try to convert traditionally independent
agencies—particularly those involved in matters of public health and
medical science—to instruments of his political will.”184 Critics assert, with
evidence, that President Trump has sought to restore a Van Buren-style
requirement of personal loyalty as well as using his power to appoint acting
officials as a kind of high-level spoils system.185 None of these is a possible
scenario that enters into the consideration of Chief Justice Roberts’ simple
and static model of separation of powers.
The model of independent regulatory agencies was an example of
the kind of cooperative arrangements among the branches and private
stakeholders that was adopted with the goal of effectuating Progressive
ideals of good government; it was also an attempt to apply constitutional
principles to a new set of situations created by the modern American
political economy. Roberts cannot logically or sensibly argue for a pure
distribution of responsibilities while at the same time accepting Executive
branch control over rulemaking; this was the basic theory of the non182. Chadha v. INS, 462 U.S. 919, 922 (1983).
183. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 275 (1993).
184. Howard Schweber, Seila Law v. Consumer Finance Protection Bureau on
Separation of Powers, in SCOTUS 2020: MAJOR DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 141, 149 (Morgan Marietta ed., 2021).
185. See, e.g., Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Vacancies, acting officials and the
warning role of the U.S. Senate, BROOKINGS (Sep. 24, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/09/24/vacancies-acting-officials-andthe-waning-role-of-the-u-s-senate/ [https://perma.cc/75CA-FR9F]; see also Glenn
Altschuler, Trump’s Contempt for Advice and Consent, THE HILL (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/511265-trumps-contempt-for-advice-andconsent [https://perma.cc/SF72-CRBN].
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delegation doctrine that the Court relied on in Schechter Poultry to strike
down the National Recover Act.186 In that case, Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for a unanimous Court, articulated a principle of balance:
unconstrained delegation of authority to the Executive branch ran afoul of
separation of powers principles precisely because it abandoned the
concomitant concept of checks and balances.187 Chief Justice Roberts gives
no apparent consideration to the possibility that a similar excessive
aggrandizement of Executive power is at work today, nor does he assert
excessive congressional control is at work; he simply treats the current set
of arrangements as an ideal point from which any departure is to be
resisted. The logical problem with that reasoning is its failure to recognize
that the current set of arrangements are themselves the result of cooperation
and compromise consistent with constitutional principles. The existence of
a modern economy necessitated an expansion of state capacity; the
constitutional implications of that development were not the abandonment
of either separation of powers or checks and balances, but rather new
specific mechanisms to give effect to those principles in an evolving
extralegal context. To assert a constitutional requirement for retaining an
earlier set of just these kinds of arrangements undercuts its own logic.
To see why, go back to Roberts’ assertion that the (alleged) novelty
of the institutional arrangement was strong evidence of its
unconstitutionality.188 This is part of a pattern of appeals to “extrajudicial
precedents” that characterizes the opinion,189 but as Justice Kagan points
out, this is an argument that proves far too much since all independent
agencies were novel institutional arrangements when they were created
starting in 1887.190 If the constitutional challenge in Seila Law had not been
brought for ten more years, would the passage of that time have required a
different outcome? “That was then, this is now,” is a truism; it is not a
constitutional principle without the accompaniment of significant further
explanation.
Furthermore, while past practice is frequently invoked in separation
of powers discussions, most often it is relied upon to explain why a practice
is constitutionally acceptable, not for a premise that past congressional
practice can be translated into a constitutional requirement. In particular,
the idea of congressional “acquiescence” demonstrated by a lack of asserted
objection over time is used to justify assertions of executive authority.191
But a constitutional principle that says that past acquiescence defines the
186. See generally Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2189.
189. David A. Strauss, Non-Judicial Precedent and the Removal Power, U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2020) https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/
27/seila-strauss/ [https://perma.cc/S8AA-SG9A].
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Dames v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
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limits of any subsequent actions is not merely novel, it makes the argument
from practice an arbitrary exercise. In Seila Law there was no objection
raised by any representative of the Executive branch, nor had there
previously been objections raised to the decades-long practice of
experimenting with different forms and models of independent agencies. 192
The argument from past practice cut at least as strongly in favor of a finding
of constitutionality as the converse. It is important to remember that the
constitutional text says nothing about removal powers; from 1789 onward
this has been a matter for debate both in Congress and the courts. That fact,
that the entire argument rests on constitutional silence, merely emphasizes
the extent to which Roberts’ constitutional argument is a pure invention.
C. Roberts’ Theory of Accountability: Applying 18th Century to a 21st
Century State
Roberts insists that he is not abandoning congressional constraints
over removal because of the key difference between single-headed and
multi-headed agencies.193 In that way, he may be taken to implicitly
recognize some form of checks and balances, but his primary concern
throughout is “accountability.” Contra Thomas, he is willing to accept an
abandonment of strict separation of powers principles so long as it is
accompanied by a congressionally created practice that serves the
constitutional purpose of keeping independent agencies “accountable”194
(once again converting the fact of prior congressional practice into a
constitutional requirement).
The problem is that his model of
accountability makes no sense either logically or empirically in a modern
context, even if one assumes the model made sense when Madison
proposed it in 1789.
The argument from accountability constitutes Roberts’ foray into
practical politics. The Chief Justice worried that a President might not be
able to control the policymaking activities of an agency due to an inherited
agency head that could not be removed for cause.195 This is a core point in
the argument. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Morrison, a “for cause”
removal restriction is not a very strict limitation on the exercise of
executive control.196 In particular, as Justice Kagan pointed out (quoting
Rehnquist), such a limitation does nothing to impede the President’s ability
to “take care” that the laws be faithfully executed since failure to execute
the laws is precisely the “cause” that the “for cause” provisions gives the

192. See generally Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct.
2183, 2188 (2020).
193. Id. at 2203.
194. Id. at 2209.
195. Id. at 2192.
196. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
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President as grounds for removal.197 A for-cause standard gives him “ample
authority to assure that [an official] is competently performing [his]
statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the [relevant
legislation’s] provisions.”198
What is missing, in other words, is not the ability of the President
to ensure that laws are enforced but rather the ability of the President to
control agency policy by preventing the faithful execution of the law. That
would be the scenario in a situation in which a newly elected President
opposes the mandate of an independent agency. Roberts presents the
reverse situation—a President who wants to see an agency’s mandate
carried out but is stymied by the resistance of an inherited agency head—
but in fact that situation falls squarely within the “for cause” removal
provision. In fact, removal on these grounds is more easily carried out with
respect to an individual agency head than a committee; evading
responsibility to take action is almost the defining characteristics of
committees. Indeed, Justice Kagan asserts that to the extent that external
control by the President is considered a desideratum, a single-headed model
provides greater rather than less control.199
Roberts ignores these concerns and instead follows Kavanaugh in
raising the specter of a threat to individual liberty posed by the potential for
arbitrary actions by agency heads are accountable to no one. As already
noted, however, this description is simply not accurate given that the
President retains the power of removal for cause. “Arbitrary” action would
almost certainly constitute cause for dismissal. Such actions would also be
subject to court challenges under the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”) and other procedural protections. The APA is what Eskridge and
Ferejohn refer to as a “super statute”200; enacted by Congress, it provides a
layer of protection of the liberty with which Roberts and Kavanaugh
profess to be concerned by constraining the manner in which agencies
exercise their functions in specific cases.
The connections between direct accountability to a President,
multiple versus single agency heads, and the protection against arbitrary
actions thus appear muddled as a matter of logic. Separately, Roberts’
argument that presidential control protects individual liberty201 flies in the
face of historical experience that led to the creation of the independent
counsel statute in Morrison. The reason is that to say that without the threat
of removal there is no accountability is to ignore the realities of government
operations and the incentives of officials. Presidents can reward as well as
punish; officials are concerned with their future positions as well as their
197. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2228 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. William Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215
(2001).
201. Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
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present ones; Congress has the ability to change the rules of operation for
an agency at any time (or to abolish them altogether). The existence of a
bipartisan system of group leadership may in fact insulate an agency from
these various mechanisms of accountability. Conversely, historical
experience teaches that too much presidential control—reifying the concept
of separation of powers without concern for checks and balances—is a
grave danger. What is also removed by the “for cause” provision is the
ability of a President to use appointments as spoils and to build his own
cadre of loyalists in positions of power, the very forms of corruption
evident during the Jacksonian Era that prompted the creation of
independent agencies in the first place. In all these respects, then, the
preservation of for cause protections serves the goals that Roberts identifies
while insisting on a multi-headed agency model does not.
All of this is arguably secondary, however, to the main point that
the Madisonian model of direct accountability to a President who is directly
accountable to the voters is nonsensical in the modern context even if it
made sense in 1789. Voters do not choose presidential candidates based on
a fine grained knowledge of the actions of agency heads, nor is the election
of a President a measure of popular will in an era in which the candidate
with fewer votes won the office, as happened in 2000 and again in 2016. An
argument of “accountability to State party leadership” might be plausibly
proposed, but that hardly comports with Roberts’ invocations of “liberty”.
Roberts was presumably aware of these aspects of presidential electoral
politics but chose to ignore them in favor of a formalistic recitation of
Madison’s formulaic statement.
Kagan argued that the important point is not whether one or another
description of presidential elections is more valid, but rather that
consideration of these variables involves political calculations of a kind that
Supreme Court justices have often showed themselves to be inexpert.202
The point is an important one. Reading Supreme Court justices make
authoritative pronouncements on questions that ignore the findings of
decades of work by political scientists is troubling enough. Realizing that
those same justices are effectively asserting that their understanding of the
political system in actual operation is superior to the understandings of the
other two political branches is startling. The result, predictably, is a selfdefeating argument that begins with a false premise about how elections
work and concludes with a solution that diminishes rather than enhances
political accountability.
In truth, the problem of accountability is precisely the reverse of the
version that Roberts propounds. Short of following the suggestion of Justice
Thomas and simply dismantling the system of independent agencies,
principles of separation of powers and principles of checks and balances
require internal constraints to prevent excessive aggrandizement of power
202. Id. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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in the agencies. But the plausible location of that accountability is not in the
person of the President nor in the operations of partisan election campaigns,
it is in Congress. The existence of a powerful system of independent
agencies requires that there be mechanisms to avoid their capture by the
President; as Roberts says, individual authority is liable to be exercised
arbitrarily, a point that is especially valid when the only check on the
exercise of that authority is a false version of “accountability” in the form
of national elections.203
Roberts relies on what Theodore Lowi called the “plebiscitary”
model of the presidency,204 one that describes a popularly elected leader
unconnected to the rest of government and directly responsible only to the
people. Once again, this is a model that entirely overlooks the concept of
checks and balances. Indeed, the word “accountability” contains within it
the obligation to “give an account”; precisely the responsibility that is
entailed by a for cause dismissal provision.205 The claim that a plebiscitary
presidency enhances accountability is especially troubling given the reality
of presidential elections; the idea that voters review or even could review
the exercise of presidential control over specific agency heads and
determine their voting preferences on that basis is laughable.206 Indeed, the
exercise of that oversight—the assurance of accountability in the
executive—is more effectively exercised by Congress, yet another reason
for courts to defer to congressional determination of what mechanisms will
enhance accountability of the President as well as of agency heads.
There is a strong case to be made that in the design of independent
agencies Congress has abdicated too much of its lawmaking role and
delegated too much authority to the Executive. Neal Katyal argues that as a
result executive-executive checks are required as much as checks that
operate between the branches.207 Katyal’s point is well taken. But the
enhancement of executive-executive checks should be even more
problematic to judges committed to separation of powers and a unitary
executive than allowing Congress to preserve the accountability of agency
heads to the branch that created their authority in the first place.

203. Id. at 2203.
204. THEODORE LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE
UNFULFILLED (Cornell Univ. Press 1985); see also, David M. Driesen, Political
Removal and the Plebiscitary Presidency: An Essay on Seila Law, LLC v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 76 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN
LAW (2021).
205. LOWI, supra note 204.
206. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises:
Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 PENN. J. OF
CONST. L. 357 (2010).
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The great fear today, as it was for the creators of the independent
agency system, should be a return to the days when the system of
administration was subject to capture by a corrupt administration. The
institution of a multi-headed leadership may be one way to prevent that
capture; a single agency head with a fixed term subject to removal for cause
is another. The model of a single agency head removable by the President at
will is surely the least desirable model from any perspective that takes the
idea of checks and balances seriously. The formalistic bright line division
between single and multi-headed agencies in Seila Law is largely
orthogonal to the real constitutional concerns at issue in the operations of
the administrative state. The precedent established by Roberts’ arguments
in the case, however, are a damaging step in the wrong direction.

